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RECENT DECISIONS
jurisdictions, as exemplified in McElwain v. Allen, 241 Mass. 112, 134 N.E. 620
(1922), would probably hold a cemetery a charitable corporation for the pur-
pose of receiving a charitable gift, but when such a decision would deprive em-
ployees of benefits explicitly granted to them by an exercise of the police power,
these same jurisdictions will hold that a cemetery is not a charitable corporation.
LLOYD J. PLANERT.
Criminal Law-Crimes Committed by or Against Indians On and Off Reser-
vations in the State-Jurisdiction of State Court.-The defendant, a Chippewa
Indian listed on the Indian rolls of the Lac Du Flambeau band of Lake Supe-
rior Indians in Wisconsin, was charged with wrongfully having in his possession
parts of a doe deer during the closed season in violation of the state game laws.
By stipulation it was agreed that the crime was committed on lands located
adjacent to an Indian reservation but within territory ceded by the Indians
to the United States under various treaties. The defendant admitted his guilt
but objected to the jurisdiction of the circuit court. The circuit court adjudged
him guilty, providing it had jurisdiction. Held, upon certified question, the state
court has jurisdiction, notwithstanding the reservation of hunting rights con-
tained in the treaties. State v. La Barge, 234 Wis. 440, 291 N.W. 299 (1940).
The court rested its disposition of the case upon State v. Morrin, 136 Wis.
552, 117 N.W. 1006 (1908) ; State v. Johnson, 212 Wis. 301, 249 N.W. 284 (1933) ;
Wardv.Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504, 16 Sup. Ct. 1076, 41 L.Ed. 244 (1896), and Peo-
ple ex rel. Kennedy v. Becker, 241 U.S. 556, 36 Sup. Ct. 705, 60 L.Ed. 1166 (1916).
The gist of these cases is that Congress has the power to abrogate the pro-
visions of an Indian Treaty and that when an act of Congress admits a state
into the Union, and declares without reservation that such state shall have all
the powers of the other states of the Union, this constitutes an abrogation of
any previous treaty stipulation with the Indians within the territory of such state
respecting their right to fish and hunt. To exempt such Indians from state laws
regulating fishing and hunting within the borders of a state after its admission
into the Union would deprive the state of its sovereign power to regulate the
rights of hunting and fishing, and would deny to such state admission into the
Union on an equal footing with the original states, upon the ground that a treaty
with the national government giving the right to hunt and fish within territory
which subsequently is embraced within the limits of a state is a privilege in con-
flict with the act of admitting the state into the Union on an equality with the.
other states and is repealed thereby.
For many years the policy of the United States was to give the Indians
themselves jurisdiction of crimes committed by one Indian against another of
the same tribe, and accordingly it was uniformly held that the United States
courts had no jurisdiction of such crimes. United States v. Rogers, 4 How. 567,
11 L.Ed. 1105 (1846) ; Nofire v. United States, 164 U.S. 657, 17 Sup. Ct. 212, 41
L.Ed. 588 (1897). Neither the federal or state courts had jurisdiction of these
offenses, such offenses being punishable solely by the laws of the tribe. Ex parte
Kan-gi-shim-ca, 109 U.S. 556, 3 Sup. Ct. 396, 27 L.Ed. 1030 (1883) ; Act March
3, 1885 (23 St. at L. 385) ; Pen. Code § 328. This original policy was changed
in 1885 when Congress conferred jurisdiction on the federal courts of the more
serious crimes committed by an Indian against another Indian or other person
within the limits of an Indian reservation located within a state, and on terri-
torial courts when the reservation was located within the limits of a territory.
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Kitto v. State, 98 Neb. 164, 152 N.W. 380 (1915); United States v. Kagama, 118
U.S. 375, 6 Sup. Ct. 1109, 30 L.Ed. 228 (1886).
The jurisdiction of the Federal Government over Indian tribes, and over the
members of such tribes while they are on an Indian reservation is exclusive.
As a consequence of this principle, it follows that while they are on their reserva-
tions the state within which the reservation is located can in no way control
or govern them. Buck v. Branson, 34 Okla. 807, 127 Pac. 436, 50 L.R.A. (N.s.)
876 (1912) ; Apapas v. United States, 233 U.S. 587, 34 Sup. Ct. 704, 58 L.Ed.
1104 (1914); State v. Campbell, 53 Minn. 354, 55 N.W. 553, 21 L.R.A. 169
(1893); Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 33 Sup. Ct. 449, 57 L.Ed. 820,
Ann. Cas. 1913E 710. But there are a few early decisions to the contrary.
See State v. Harris, 47 Wis. 298, 2 N.W. 543 (1879); State v. Doxtater, 47 Wis.
278, 2 N.W. 439 (1879) ; Deragon v. Sero, 137 Wis. 276, 118 N.W. 839, 20 L.R.A.
(N.s.) 842 (1908). Although an Indian becomes a full-fledged citizen of the
United States, yet if he continues to live on a reservation he is subject to the
exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. See Notes: Ann. Cas. 1914B 652; Ann.
Cas. 1915D 371. Congress can provide that the laws of the state shall extend over
and apply to Indian country. Eddy v. Lafayette, 163 U.S. 456, 16 Sup. Ct. 1082,
41 L.Ed. 225 (1896).
But Indians, although living on a reservation and maintaining tribal relations,
are amenable to the laws of the state when they are off the reservation. EX
parte Moore, 28 S.D. 339, 133 N.W. 817, Ann. Cas. 1914B 648 (1911). In the
absence of a statute or treaty provision granting or retaining jurisdiction in
favor of the United States, the state courts have exclusive jurisdiction over crimes
committed by tribal or other Indians within the state and outside the limits of
any Indian reservation. In re Wolf, 27 Fed. 606 (D.C. Ark. 1886) ; United States
v. Kiya, 126 Fed. 879 (D.C. N.D. 1903); United States v. Frank Black Spotted
Horse, 282 Fed. 349 (D.C. S.D. 1922) ; United States v. Sa-coo-da-cot, 27 Fed.
Cas. No. 16, 212, 1 Dill. 271, 1 Abb. 377 (C.C. Neb. 1870); Draper v. United
States, 164 U.S. 240, 17 Sup. Ct. 107, 41 L.Ed. 419 (1896); United States v. La
Plant, 200 Fed. 92 (D.C. S.D. 1911). Under its police power a state within
whose borders a tribe is located may exercise a police power over the persons
and property of such Indians, so far as necessary to preserve the peace of the
state and protect the tribe from imposition and intrusion, e.g., prohibiting the
settlement on Indian lands of persons other than Indians. New York v. Dibble,
21 How. 366, 16 L.Ed. 149 (1859). Thus, a state can prohibit the sale of intoxi-
cating liquors to Indians in the exercise of its police power. State v. Mamlock,
58 Wash. 631, 109 Pac. 47 (1910). But it is settled that the use of intoxicating
liquors on an Indian reservation cannot be regulated by the state within whose
borders the reservation is located in the absence of an act so providing. United
States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 34 Sup. Ct. 1, 58 L.Ed. 107 (1913). Unless
restricted by treaty with the Indian tribe or by the act admitting the state into
the Union or by other acts of Congress then in existence, the state jurisdiction
extends over the territorial limits of an Indian reservation so as to apply to all
crimes committed thereon by persons not members of the tribe against other
non-members of the tribe, and in such case the United States courts have no
jurisdiction. United States v. McBrantey, 104 U.S. 621, 26 L.Ed. 869 (1882).
Again, Indians are amenable to state laws for murder or other offenses against
such laws, committed by them off the reservation and within the limits of the
state, even though the crime is committed against an Indian of the same tribe.
State v. Campbell, supra; Pablo v. People, 23 Colo. 134, 46 Pac. 636 (1896).
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Clearly and logically, it follows that crimes committed outside of a reservation
by white persons against Indians are also punishable under the laws of the
state where such crime is committed. State v. Campbell, supra. Even a clause in
an enabling act providing that "Indian lands shall remain under the absolute
jurisdiction and control of the Congress of the United States," does not deprive
the state courts of such exclusive jurisdiction over crimes on Indian reserva-
tions not committed by or against Indians. United States v. Kagama, supra. But
Donnelly v. United States, supra, held that the jurisdiction of the federal courts
over Indian reservations within state limits extends not only to crimes committed
by an Indian, but also to crimes committed on the reservation against an Indian
by a white person. An Indian who has taken land in severalty and who has
voluntarily taken up within the limits of the state his residence separate from
any tribe of Indians, and who has adopted habits of civilized life, is amenable
to the general criminal laws of the state as to all criminal offenses, although
committed within an Indian reservation, excepting only where the acts of .Con-
gress, by express provisions, in particular cases made the law of the United
States applicable to such Indians. Kitto v. State, supra; State v. Ninrod, 30 S.D.
239, 138 N.W. 377 (1912).
The federal court has jurisdiction of a crime committed against an allottee
Indian, or an allotment held in trust by the United States for the allottee, within
the trust period. United States v. Pelican, 232 U.S. 442, 34 Sup. Ct 396, 58
L.Ed. 676 (1914). The federal court has jurisdiction of a crime committed on an
Indian reservation by an Indian allottee who has not received a patent from the
United States and is under the charge of a United States agent State v. Con-
don, 79 Wash. 97, 139 Pac. 871 (1914). But the United States courts have no
exclusive jurisdiction over an offense committed by one Indian against another
Indian on an Indian allotment upon the public domain outside the boundaries of
any reservation and within the limits of the state. Ex parte Moore, supra. As to
whether the federal courts have jurisdiction of offenses committed on Indian
reservations by or against Indian allottees, who, by statute, have become citizens
or have been made subject to state laws, there is an apparent lack of harmony
in the decisions. It has been decided in some cases that the federal courts have
jurisdiction. United States v. Logan, 105 Fed. 240 (C.C. Ore. 1900); State v.
Columbia George, 39 Ore. 127, 65 Pac. 604 (1901). Other cases hold that the
jurisdiction is in the state courts. Louie v. United States, 274 Fed. 47 (C.C.A.
9th 1921) ; In re Now-ge-zhuck, 69 Kan. 410, 76 Pac. 877 (1904) ; State v. Lott,
21 Idaho 646, 123 Pac. 491 (1912).
HERMAN J. GLINSKI.
Criminal Law-Misprision of Felony.-The defendant, having knowledge of
the commission of the offense of armed robbery, failed to make a disclosure of
this felony to the proper authorities and did nothing toward the apprehension
of the persons guilty of the crime. The defendant was not a police officer. He
had received no compensation for his failure to report the crime. Later the
defendant was convicted of misprision. of a felony due to his non-disclosure of
the facts of the crime.
Held, Judgment reversed. Mere silence is not sufficient to be regarded as
"concealment!' of a felony unless such, in purpose, is in aid of an offender and
of such nature as to constitute one an accessory after the fact. Short of this,
the old time common law offense of misprision of a felony is not now a substan-
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